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ATTACHMENT A: Summary of Major Recommendations and Ideas

1. New NIE's: The consultants agreed that estimates cutting across national boundaries to focus on broad basic issues would be valuable additions to the O/NE program. Although the consultants recognized certain production and coordination problems would arise from this approach, they proposed four new estimates incorporating the "basic issue" principle.

(a) Estimate on Western Europe:

Discussion revealed general agreement that new developments in Europe justify a European regional estimate of broad scope. Suggestions for topical issues included analysis of the trend toward neutralism, the growth of and prospects for the Socialist Parties, prospects for and consequences of European union, long-range economic problems, and attitudes toward alliance with the US.

(b) Estimate on the Future of Socialist Movements:

The consultants felt that there is sufficient evidence of Socialist reinvigoration to warrant a study of the prospects for Socialist Parties around the world and the likely consequences of Socialist governments coming into power in such countries as Italy, France, Germany, Japan, and India.

(c) Estimate on Trouble Spots around the World:

The consultants agreed that future major problems are likely to result from anticolonial and nationalization impulses prevalent in underdeveloped areas of the world. The consultants also expressed concern at the seemingly narrow view taken of "brush fire" wars and possible Communist gains resulting from brush fire wars in which no Communists participate. These two ideas were combined in a suggestion for an estimate which would highlight areas of high potential for outbreaks of violence and analyze areas where anticolonial emotions are at high pitch and where there is danger of nationalization of foreign holdings which could ignite brush fire wars.

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(d) Estimate on the Outlook for World Trade:

The proposal for this estimate evoked a discussion of the possibility for commissioning an independent study outside of CIA and then either infusing it into the NSC blood stream or using it as a basic document for IAC coordination. Although there was no general agreement on method of preparation, all agreed that it was a necessary and timely subject for a study.

2. Soviet Orbit Affairs

25X1A [redacted] reporting on their recent visits
25X1A to the Soviet Union, placed differing emphasis on the status of Soviet
25X1A collective leadership. [redacted] felt that Malenkov, Molotov, and
25X1A Bulganin were under considerable tension and that there was sharp
25X1A competition for Khrushchev's dominant position. [redacted] did not
25X1A sense so great a degree of uneasiness and insecurity among the top
25X1A leaders. [redacted] found general economic conditions better than
25X1A he had expected while [redacted] found them not so good as he had
25X1A anticipated. It was [redacted] impression that the Soviet technicians
and intellectuals had adjusted themselves to the regime's monopoly
of political and social decision and that they functioned effectively
within the confines of their professions without particular regard for
political or social matters. The relaxation of internal tensions had
enhanced the intellectual's accommodation of their compartmentalized role
in the Soviet state. This view was not unanimously accepted by the con-
sultants and led to a discussion of the possibility that increased freedom
for the technical and intellectual groups to express themselves on
professional matters might eventually create pressures for wider social
and political freedoms which the regime could not resist. There was
also a lack of agreement as to whether or not the new anti-Stalin
policy is irreversible. The consultants expressed a great deal of
interest in the meaning of the Tito-Khrushchev meetings. [redacted] 25X1A
observed, and others agreed, that the last NIE on Yugoslavia was
"remarkably flat" in view of recent developments. The general question
of Soviet-Satellite relations re-emerged from time to time throughout
the conference.

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3. Observations on the memoranda concerning the World Situation

25X1A Estimate: The consultants agreed that the O/NE memorandum grasped the basic issues and felt that its tone, less optimistic than the previous estimate, was correct. [REDACTED] would revise the order of the three major topic headings to discuss basic hostility first, then increasing equality and mutual deterrence. He also suggested increased emphasis on the Soviet domestic situation and the issue of imperialism. There was general agreement that the memorandum did not sufficiently define key concepts, such as "tensions," "neutralism," and "self-determination," and that any estimate of the world situation should highlight things to watch for rather than attempt to predict events. On a number of occasions, in this discussion and others, the consultants expressed sharp interest in Soviet-Satellite relations and their feeling that the question should be given careful consideration.

4. The Middle East: The consultants generally agreed with Mr.

25X1A [REDACTED] opinion that an estimate on the [REDACTED] Middle 25X6 East was untimely, although it might be possible to analyze events which might effect [REDACTED] The consultants also agreed that 25X6 [REDACTED] in the Middle East was not essential to their 25X1A long-run economic interests, although [REDACTED] pointed out that loss of 25X6 [REDACTED] rulers and governing elite groups throughout the Arab fear Nasser may undermine their positions and that it is difficult for the Arab rulers to oppose the popular appeal of Nasser's actions and theories.

5. The consultants agreed that their group functions better and contributes more when it has a general outline or a memorandum to discuss rather than a finished NIE. They suggested that memoranda, outlines or sets of questions geared into O/NE production schedule be prepared as a basis for discussion at future meetings.

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